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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890222-CA 
v. : 
JAMES LEWIS GREEN, AKA : Category No. 2 
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS, 
: 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of manufacturing a 
controlled substance, a felony of the second degree in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1988), following a jury trial in the First District Court, 
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, Judge Gordon J. Low 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) and S 77-35-26(b)(1) (Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the search warrant upon which the search of 
defendant's garage/laboratory was premised was based upon 
information that established probable cause. 
2. Whether the informant was acting as an agent for 
the police, which triggers sanctions under the fourth amendment 
to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution requiring exclusion of evidence seized 
because of his misconduct* 
3. Whether the State's failure to preserve all 
chemicals seized denied defendant due process and a fair trial. 
4. Whether the provisions in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(4) (Supp. 1988) and S 58-37-3 (1986) that establish that a 
controlled substance includes substances listed on the schedules 
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, as revised by Congress 
or administrative rule of the United States Attorney General, is 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and 
deprived defendant due process. 
5. Whether the jury instructions properly defined the 
State's burden of proof, and whether the court erred in refusing 
defendant's proposed instruction No. 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Supp. 
1988)t 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, 
or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
• • . 
(iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988)I 
(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor included in 
schedules I, II, III, IV, of V of Section 58-
37-4, and also includes a drug, substance, or 
immediate precursor included in schedules I, 
II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, as 
those schedules may be revised to add, 
delete, or transfer substances from one 
schedule to another, whether by Congressional 
enactment or by administrative rule of the 
United States Attorney General adopted under 
Section 201 of that act. Controlled 
substance does not include distilled spirits, 
wine, or malt beverages, as those terms of 
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding 
tobacco or food. 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986)s 
(1) All controlled substances listed in S 
58-37-4 are hereby controlled. 
(2) All controlled substances listed in 
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title 
II, P.L. 91-513), as it amended from time to 
time, are hereby controlled. 
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, 
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled 
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of 
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title 
II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be 
revised by Congressional enactment or by 
administrative rule of the United States 
Attorney General adopted pursuant to S 201 of 
that act, that subsequent designation, 
rescheduling or deletion shall govern. 
Additional constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are quoted in the text of the brief as they become 
relevant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Michael Lewis Green, aka James Alvin 
Douglas, was convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance 
and possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (phenyl-2-propanone) following a jury trial on 
February 27, 1989, to March 2, 1989, in First District Court in 
and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon J. 
Low, judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
About the end of January, 1987, Andre Pommier began 
doing various carpentry remodeling jobs for the defendant at 
defendant's residence (Pre-trial Motions Transcript, January 18, 
1989, hereinafter "P.T." 90; Trial Transcript, hereinafter "T" 
343). During the course of his employment Mr. Pommier noticed 
water running out of the garage (P.T. 92; T. 346), and at various 
times noticed a funny smell around the garage (P.T. 93; T. 346). 
Defendant told Mr. Pommier that there was furniture stored in the 
garage (P.T. 93; T. 345). Mr. Pommier became curious and looked 
inside the window of the garage; he did not see any furniture but 
noticed a glass container with a glass tube with a coil inside 
coming out of it with tubes attached (P.T. 93). 
During the summer of 1987, Mr. Pommier was doing 
demolition work on an atrium that was connected to defendant's 
garage when he found a key to the garage (P.T. 91; T. 346). Mr. 
Pommier used the key without defendant's knowledge, went inside 
the garage, and found lab equipment, tables, and various chemicals 
(P.T. 346; T. 92). Mr. Pommier was curious about the activities 
going on inside the garage and had a duplicate key made (P.T. 92). 
He entered the garage two or three times and looked into the 
garage on at least six occasions (T. 347-8). The lab equipment 
was always in the garage when he looked or went in (P.T. 95; T. 
348). Mr. Pommier quit working for defendant in April of 1988 (T. 
347). The last time he went in the garage was shortly before he 
quit working. 
Mr. Pommier felt that something illegal was going on in 
the garage (T. 349). On June 27, 1988, Mr. Pommier told sheriff's 
deputy Lynn Yeates what he had observed in defendant's garage and 
asked him what he should do with the knowledge (T. 349). Deputy 
Yeates urged Mr. Pommier come into talk with police officers on 
June 29, 1988. Mr. Pommier described to Deputy Mike Johnson 
various equipment, glassware and chemicals he had observed on the 
premises (R. 185-186). This information was described to Art 
Terkelson at the Weber State Crime Lab, who told the officers that 
the equipment, glassware and chemicals were all consistent with 
the production of phenyl-2-propanone and methamphetamine, both 
controlled substances (R. 188; T. 300). As a result of the 
information relayed by Mr. Pommier, the sheriff's office began an 
investigation of defendant and set up surveillance of defendant 
and his residence (T. 51). They followed defendant from his home 
on several occasions. Officers testified that each time defendant 
drove in an erratic fashion which made it hard for the officers to 
follow him (T. 54). 
A search warrant was executed on September 15, 1988, 
which included police officers from Cache County, Logan City, Box 
Elder, Tremonton, Drug Enforcement Administration, and State 
Narcotics (T. 55). Defendant was placed under arrest and advised 
of his rights (T. 302-303). Defendant indicated that he 
understood his rights and agreed to speak with the officers (T. 
303, 312). Kim Hall, an agent with the Utah Division of 
Investigations, Narcotics Section, interviewed defendant. 
Defendant stated "I know that you've got meM (T. 322). When 
defendant was asked where the chemicals were going he replied 
"that it wasn't in this state, and that he felt his life would be 
in danger" if he were to tell the authorities (T. 314). Defendant 
stated that the Hell's Angels were somehow involved in the 
delivery of the chemicals. He stated to the officers that "you 
can go to jail and you can come back. You go to dead, you don't 
come back.H (T. 314). 
Chuck Hall, a chemist for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, testified that in his opinion the laboratory in 
defendant's garage was involved at the time of the search in the 
production of phenyl-2-propanone (T. 106-07), Under Mr. Hall's 
direction samples were taken of thirteen chemicals. These 
chemicals were tested by Art Terkelson at the Weber State Crime 
Lab. The samples were found to contain, among other things, 
phenyl-2-propanone (T. 232-235) which is a precursor to the 
production of methamphetamine, and phenylacetic acid which is a 
precursor to the production of phenyl-2-propanone (113, 118). 
Officers found 15-50 gallon drums of phenylacetic acid on 
defendant's premises. They also found chemical formulas for the 
production of phenyl-2-propanone using phenylacetic acid (T. Ill), 
and formulas for the production of phenylacetic acid (T. 112). 
Officers inventoried approximately 80-100 chemicals and 
various pieces of lab equipment which were seized from defendant's 
premises (P.T. 15-16). After sampling what Mr. Hall felt were key 
chemicals and inventorying all the chemicals and equipment seized, 
Mr. Hall recommended that the remainder of the chemicals be 
destroyed because of fire hazard, explosion hazard, poison hazard, 
pollution hazard and Environmental Protection Agency law (T. 124-
126). The remaining chemicals were destroyed. 
Defendant testified at trial. He claimed that he fired 
Mr. Pommier because he had stolen things from defendant's home (T. 
480). He contradicted the testimony of the police officers 
pertaining to the interview at his home at the time of his arrest, 
and denied making the statement that Myou got me" (T. 492). He 
also denied telling the officers that he would be shipping the 
chemicals out of the state (T. 490,496). He denied that he was 
manufacturing phenyl-2-propanone (T. 493). He denied the presence 
of the 750 pounds of phenylacetic acid (T. 505). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The search of defendant's home and garage was premised 
upon a valid search warrant which was supported by probable 
cause. 
The informant was neither an employee nor agent of the 
government. He was acting solely as a private person when he 
entered defendant's premises and discovered his illegal 
activities. Consequently, any wrongdoing on his part does not 
trigger the exclusionary rule. 
While agents seized about one hundred kinds of 
chemicals from defendant's home and preserved only about a dozen 
chemicals, which were later analyzed, the destruction of the 
chemicals did not deny defendant due process or a fair trial. 
The police inventoried the chemicals seized and defendant was not 
precluded from presenting evidence that he possessed other 
chemicals that were not associated with the production of phenyl-
2-propanone. The evidence destroyed was not constitutionally 
material to his defense. 
The Utah legislature did not unconstitutionally 
delegate its powers by including in the definition of a 
controlled substances, those substances which are defined as 
controlled by federal law. 
The jury was properly instructed on the burden of 
proof. Defendant's requested instruction No. 1 was not an 
accurate statement of the law and was not supported by the 
evidence. The trial court, therefore, did not err in refusing to 
give the instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SUPPORT ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant argues that evidence seized during a search 
of his home should have been suppressed based on his claim that 
the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause 
sufficient to support issuance of the search warrant. He alleges 
the affidavit supporting the search warrant is defective for 
several reasons: (1) the allegations set forth in the affidavit 
did not establish probable cause as the affidavit did not reveal 
the basis of the confidential informant's knowledge, nor did it 
establish the informant's veracity; (2) there were misstatements 
in the affidavit which should be excised; (3) there were material 
omissions; and (4) the information relied on in the affidavit was 
stale. 
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) 
(footnote omitted), the Utah Supreme Court defined the standard 
by which search warrant affidavits are to be judged: 
Search warrant affidavits are to be 
construed in a common-sense, reasonable 
manner. State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d 132, 
133 (Utah 1983); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 
441 (Utah 1978). Excessive technical 
dissection of an informant's tip or of the 
nontechnical language in the officer's 
affidavit is ill-suited to this task. 
[Illinois v. Gates] 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-
36, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-30, 2330-31. In Gates, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that an 
informant's "reliability" and "basis of 
knowledge" are but two relevant 
considerations, among others, in determining 
the existence of probable cause under "a 
totality-of-the-circumstances." 462 U.S. at 
233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2329-30. They are not 
strict, independent requirements to be 
"rigidly exacted" in every case. A weakness 
in one or the other is not fatal to the 
warrant so long as in the totality there is 
substantial basis to find probable cause. 
Id. 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332. The 
indicia of veracity, reliability, and basis 
of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be 
evaluated in reaching the practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability 
that the contraband will be found in the 
place described. 
The search warrant affidavit in the instant case easily 
meets the Hansen standard. Defendant correctly points out that 
the United States Supreme Court, as well as the Utah Supreme 
Court, have rejected as hypertechnical the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 
Despite defendant's statement to the contrary, he would have this 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v, United 
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Aguilar-Spinelli test required 
separate showing of the underlying circumstances of the 
informant's tip to reveal the basis of his knowledge, and to 
establish the veracity or the reliability of the informant. 
Court continue to apply the Aguilar-Spinelll litmus test in 
judging the instant affidavit. His reliance on State v. Bailey, 
675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984), to support use of this rigid test is 
misplaced. In Bailey, the Court stated that in some situations 
the Aquilar-Spinelli guidelines might be necessary to establish 
sufficient probable cause. However, the Court went on to state 
that M[i]n other cases, . . . a less strong showing of the basis 
of the affiant's knowledge, veracity and reliability may be 
required, if the circumstances as a whole indicate that the 
informant's report is truthful." Icl. at 1205-6. Some of the 
factors the Court considered relevant in this inquiry are: the 
detail with which the informant described his personal observation 
of the contraband; the informant, an apparently disinterested 
person, volunteered the information; and the informant stood to 
gain nothing from providing the information. The Court stated 
that Minformation from citizen informants who stand to gain 
nothing from providing information to the police is not viewed 
with the same rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a regular 
police informant." Icl. at 1206. 
In the instant case, the informant was a disinterested 
citizen who volunteered the information and stood to gain nothing 
from providing the information. He described in detail the 
contents of the garage/laboratory. It is clear that the correct 
standard to be applied in this case is that espoused by the 
Supreme Court in Hansen. Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, there is a substantial basis to find probable cause 
to support issuance of the warrant for the search of defendant's 
home. The informant, Andy Pommier, worked for the defendant (T. 
343). He personally observed on the premises large amounts of 
chemicals, lab equipment and glassware (P.T. 346; T. 92; R. 185-
86). He described these in detail to the police (R. 185-86). The 
police knew the informant to be a member of the community in good 
standing, that he was reliable, and that he volunteered the 
information with no claim for reward or legal favor (P.T. 55). 
Detectives described the lab equipment and chemicals to a 
criminalist, Art Turkelson, at the Weber State Crime Lab who 
stated that they were consistent with the type of equipment and 
chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine or phenyl-2-
propanone, both controlled substances (R. 188). Under these 
circumstances the judge was justified in finding that there was 
probable cause sufficient for issuance of the search warrant. 
Defendant also attacks the statement in the affidavit 
that the substances and equipment observed at his residence were 
consistent with the production of the controlled substances. 
Defendant's contention on this point is not clear, but seems to be 
that the affidavit should have indicated that the chemicals and 
equipment observed at defendant's residence were inconsistent with 
some legal use. Furthermore he avers that the criminalist could 
not have concluded that possession of the chemicals listed was 
illegal since possession of the individual chemicals was not in 
itself illegal. If this Court were to accept this position, it 
would effectively preclude the issuance of search warrants for 
clandestine-type labs, since a person would not only have to 
observe the chemicals and equipment, but observe the entire 
process. Defendant makes the specious claim that possession of 
legal chemicals which could be combined to make illegal substances 
would somehow make all chemical companies subject to search at any 
time. This argument, along with the others espoused by defendant, 
seems to be precisely the type of hypertechnical dissection of 
search warrant affidavits that the Supreme Court is trying to 
avoid. 
Defendant next claims that there were two misstatements 
in the affidavit which must be excised. In State v. Nielsen, 727 
P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme court, relying on the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978), held: 
a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to challenge the validity of a search 
warrant if the defendant can establish that 
(i) an affiant in an affidavit supporting a 
search warrant made a false statement 
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, and (ii) the 
affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause after the 
misstatement is set aside. 483 U.S. 171-72. 
• • • 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. The Court went on to hold that the 
misstatement "is not to be a factor in the decision to suppress 
unless the misconduct materially affects the finding of probable 
cause." Id. See also Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130-132. The 
misstatements alleged by defendant fail to meet this standard, 
first, because the statements were not false; second, even if they 
were false they were not made intentionally, knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth; and finally, the misstatements 
were not material and their omission would not have affected the 
finding of probable cause. 
The first alleged misstatement is in paragraph four of 
the affidavit, where the affiant states that the confidential 
informant "told your affiant of what he believed to be a 
clandestine-type lab producing illegal substances located at the 
residence in Perry." Defendant claims this is a misstatement 
based upon his assertion that the informant never used the words 
"clandestine-type lab." This, again, is the type of "excessive 
technical dissection of an informant's tip or of the nontechnical 
language in the officer's affidavit" which the Supreme Court 
disapproved in Hansen. Hansen at 130. It seems obvious that even 
if the informant never used the "magic" words, he did convey to 
the police the idea that there was a secret lab at defendant's 
home which he suspected was being used to produce illegal 
substances. The statement is not false. Regardless of the 
informant's characterization of the lab, his information about the 
presence of lab equipment and chemicals that a state criminalist 
found to be consistent with the production of controlled 
substances would have supported issuance of the search warrant. 
The second alleged misstatement deals with the 
statement in the affidavit that the chemicals observed at 
defendant's residence could be used to produce phenyl-2-propanone. 
This is substantially the same argument as defendant makes in 
Point IV of his brief, that phenyl-2-propanone is not specifically 
mentioned in the Utah Controlled Substance Act and that it is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to allow the 
federal government to schedule controlled substances. The 
constitutional aspects of this issue will be argued in Point IV of 
this brief. This inquiry is not relevant to defendant's claim 
that the affidavit contains a misstatement as the issuing 
magistrate would have been guided by the unambiguous language of 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3(2) which reads: "All controlled 
substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title 
II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby 
controlled." At the time of the issuance of the search warrant, 
phenyl-2-propanone was listed in the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act as a controlled substance. The magistrate was justified in 
issuing the search warrant on this authority. Should the Court 
decide that this is a misstatement, it is not material. The 
affidavit stated that the chemicals and equipment at defendant's 
residence were consistent with the production of phenyl-2-
propanone and methamphetamine. Methamphetairdne is specifically 
listed in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) as a schedule II 
controlled substance. Were phenyl-2-propanone to be excised from 
the affidavit, the issuing magistrate would still have been 
justified in issuing the search warrant to search for 
methamphetamine. 
Defendant next claims that there was a material 
omission from the affidavit which should be read back into the 
affidavit. The material omission asserted by defendant is the 
fact that the previous owner of defendant's home was a high school 
chemistry teacher, and that this would explain the presence of 
chemicals and equipment in defendant's home. The foundation of 
this argument rests on the porous claim that the chemistry teacher 
stored "substantial" chemicals and equipment in his home, and that 
when he moved he left behind substantial amounts of personal 
property. These assumptions are unfounded; the more natural 
assumption would be that when the former owner moved, he took all 
of his personal belongings. This is in fact what happened; when 
the former owner moved, he left the house and garage empty (T. 
329). It had been fifteen years since he had taught high school 
chemistry and had never had a chemistry lab in his home (T. 329). 
The fact that the former owner of the house was a chemistry 
teacher was not a material omission from the affidavit and the 
Court need not read this information into the affidavit. 
Defendant's final contention is that the information 
relied on in the affidavit was stale. He relies solely on federal 
case law to support this point. Utah case law would clearly 
uphold the issuance of the search warrant in the instant case. In 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Court upheld the 
issuance of a search warrant which relied on an affidavit which 
specified no dates when an informant observed marijuana on 
defendant's premises. In that case the Court found that the 
affidavit "which describes on-going criminal activity, clearly 
refutes any contention that it was based upon stale information." 
Id. at 1261. 
In Hansen the Court upheld the issuance of a search 
warrant where a period of time had lapsed between observance of 
the contraband and issuance of a search warrant. The Court held 
that w[a] mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate the 
supporting basis for the warrant." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 
131. The Court cited Anderton and found that "a common-sense 
reading of that affidavit suggested the continuing nature of the 
drug's presence.- Id. 
These cases make it clear that a magistrate may issue a 
search warrant if a period of time has lapsed between observance 
of the contraband and issuance of the search warrant if the 
affidavit suggests that the nature of the criminal activity is on-
going. In the instant case, the issuing magistrate was presented 
with an affidavit which alleged that a clandestine drug laboratory 
was producing illegal substances. Drug manufacturing is a classic 
example of an on-going criminal activity. The amount of chemicals 
observed and the nature of the lab equipment suggested that the 
operation would still be operating at the time of the issuance of 
the warrant. 
Other jurisdictions have considered this situation and, 
likewise, have found that a search warrant may be issued if the 
nature of the crime is on-going. See State v. King, 752 P.2d 869, 
870 (Or. App. 1988) ("The facts asserted in the affidavit 
indicated that there was a large scale, on-going drug operation 
from which a magistrate, after considering all of the relevant 
factors contained within the affidavit, could reasonably infer 
that the contraband was still on the premises."); U.S. v. Dozier, 
844 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); State v. Garcia, 566 P.2d 426 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1977); State v. Torrez, 544 P.2d 207 (Ariz. 1975); State 
v, Austria, 524 P.2d 290 (Haw. 1974). 
POINT II 
THE INFORMANT WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR 
THE STATE, AND HIS CONDUCT DOES NOT TRIGGER 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
Defendant claims that the evidence seized during the 
search of his residence should be suppressed because the 
confidential informant, Andy Pommier, entered his premises 
illegally. His theory has three theoretical bases: first, he 
claims that the entry was illegal because Mr. Pommier was a 
government employee or agent when he entered defendant's garage 
and was constitutionally constrained from entering the premises; 
second, he argues that if Mr. Pommier was not a government 
employee or agent, he was "acting" as a government agent when he 
entered the garage, and was therefore constitutionally constrained 
in his actions; and, finally, he makes the unsupported argument 
that the illegality of Mr. Pommier's entry into the garage by 
itself should bar use of the evidence. 
The primary question is whether at the time of Mr. 
Pommier's entries into defendant's garage, he was acting as a 
private citizen. If he were acting as a private citizen, 
defendant's argument must fail. The Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), controls disposition of 
this issue. In Watts the Court stated: 
The fourth amendment guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures protects 
only against governmental actions and does 
not extend to the independent acts of private 
citizens. Thus, as was observed in Walter v. 
United States, [447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 
65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980),] the exclusionary rule 
has no application to evidence obtained from 
private citizens acting on their own 
initiative: "[A] wrongful search or seizure 
conducted by a private party does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment and . . . such private 
wrongdoing does not deprive the government of 
the right to use evidence that it has 
acquired lawfully." Likewise, this Court in 
State v. Newbold# [581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972) 
(plurality opinion)] held, "The protection of 
the Fourth Amendment is a restraint only upon 
the activities of sovereign authority and is 
not applicable to the searches and seizures 
by any persons other than government officers 
and agents. •  
unreasonable private searches are not subject 
to the protection of article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 1220-21 (footnotes omitted). 
Defendant's first claim, that Mr. Pommier was a 
government employee or agent when he first entered defendant's 
garage, is without support either in the record or in the law. 
Defendant's argument seems to be that Mr. Pommier, acting in his 
capacity as an assistant fire marshall, entered the garage to make 
an inspection. Mr. Pommier was a member of the volunteer fire 
department and sometimes acted as assistant fire marshall (P.T. 
96). As a volunteer fireman, he had no duties to inspect homes. 
He testified that he acted as assistant fire marshall only when 
the fire marshall was out of town (T. 96). As assistant fire 
marshall, he understood his duties to be the inspection of 
businesses and, on request, the inspection of fireplaces at 
residences, though there are no specific written duties of 
assistant fire marshall (T. 134). He testified that when he 
searched defendant's garage, he was not searching for hazards (T. 
135), nor was he acting as an agent of the fire department (T. 
93). Despite defendant's insistent contention to the contrary, 
Mr. Pommier entered defendant's garage merely out of curiosity 
(P.T. 93# 106, 107# 113, 135; T. 346, 354, 355). 
Defendant makes the unsupported claim that Mr. Pommier 
could have been considered a special function officer under Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-la-4, as a fire arson investigator. This argument 
fails because defendant has failed to show that Mr. Pommier is a 
fire arson investigator. It seems highly unlikely that a member 
of a volunteer fire department would be automatically qualified to 
be a fire arson investigator. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. 
Pommier is a fire arson investigator, he is not necessarily a 
peace officer as subsection (3)(a) requires that a "special 
function officer may not exercise the authority of a peace officer 
until the officer has satisfactorily completed an approved basic 
training program for special function officers." It has not been 
demonstrated that Mr. Pommier is a fire arson investigator, nor 
that he has ever completed the basic training program for special 
function officers. For these reasons, Mr. Pommier could not be 
considered a government agent when he entered defendant's garage. 
Defendant next claims that Mr. Pommier was acting as an 
agent of the government when he entered defendant's garage. In 
Watts, the Court found that there are two areas of inquiry which 
bear upon the determination of whether a person is acting 
privately or as a government agent when he/she conducts a search: 
(1) the government's knowledge of or acquiescence in the intrusive 
conduct, and (2) the intent and purpose of the person conducting 
the search. In Watts, an informant was told by the police that if 
he provided them with information leading to a prosecutable case, 
a criminal case against him might be dismissed. The informant 
told the police that there was a shed in back of the defendant's 
house where he was growing and curing marijuana plants. The 
police, acting on the tip, obtained a search warrant and found the 
contraband in the shed. The court upheld the admission of the 
evidence since the informant was acting as a private citizen when 
he illegally entered the defendant's shed. The court concluded 
that the informant's "specific actions were for the most part his 
own and were not substantially motivated by the prompting and 
encouragement of the Provo Police Department." jUi. at 1223. 
The instant case is even more compelling. Mr. Pommier 
had no prior contact with the police at the time he entered 
defendant's garage. He had no expectation of reward. It seems 
obvious that Mr. Pommier's actions were not "for the most part" 
his own, but were totally his own. This Court should find that 
Mr. Pommier was acting as a private citizen when he entered 
defendant's garage as the government had no knowledge of or 
acquiescence in the intrusive conduct, and Mr. Pommier's intent in 
entering the garage was the satisfaction of curiosity with no 
expectation of reward. 
Defendant's final point is redundant. Claiming that 
the prosecution's use of illegally obtained evidence violates due 
process is just another way of saying Mr. Pommier was an agent of 
the police when he entered defendant's garage. State v. Louden, 
387 P.2d 240 (Utah 1963), which defendant cites, is inapposite. 
Further, it was vacated by the United States Supreme Court at 379 
U.S. 1. Louden dealt with an illegal search by a police officer, 
not a private citizen. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AS THE 
EVIDENCE DESTROYED BY THE STATE WAS NOT 
MATERIAL TO HIS GUILT OR INNOCENCE. 
Defendant claims that his due process rights were 
violated when the State, after taking samples of chemicals found 
on defendant's premises that were consistent with the production 
of controlled substances, destroyed other chemicals located on his 
premises which were hazardous. Defendant's argument on this point 
is confusing, but seems to be that the chemicals that were 
destroyed would have been material in supporting his theory that 
the chemicals could have been used in manufacturing substances 
other than controlled substances. 
In State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court established the standard to judge whether 
destruction of evidence constitutes a denial of due process: 
In State v. Stewart, Utah, 544 P.2d 477 
(1975), we said, "[A] deliberate suppression 
or destruction of evidence by those charged 
with the prosecution, including police 
officers, constitutes a denial of due process 
if the evidence is material to guilt or 
innocence of the defendant in a criminal case 
. . . ." Id. at 479 (emphasis added). We 
clarified this proposition in State v. 
Nebeker, Utah, 657 P.2d 1359 (1983), where we 
said, "The materiality required to reverse a 
criminal conviction for suppression or 
destruction of evidence as a denial of due 
process is more than evidentiary 
materiality.,f Ijci. at 1363. Rather, it must 
be "material in the constitutional sense." 
Id. (emphasis added). Constitutional 
materiality requires that there be a showing 
that the suppressed or destroyed evidence is 
vital to the issues of whether the defendant 
is guilty of the charge and whether there is 
fundamental unfairness that requires the 
Court to set aside the defendant's 
conviction. Ici. A corollary of this 
proposition is, "The mere possibility that an 
item of undisclosed information might have 
helped the defense, or might have affected 
the outcome of the trial, does not establish 
'materiality' in the constitutional sense," 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 
96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400-2401, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 
(1976) (emphasis added); accord Nebeker, 657 
P.2d at 1363. 
The gravamen of this issue is whether the chemicals destroyed by 
the State could be considered evidence which is material in the 
constitutional sense. The question is whether the destroyed 
chemicals are material to the innocence of the defendant. The 
destroyed evidence was simply not constitutionally material to 
defendant's defense. 
Defendant's argument on this point is based on a 
misunderstanding of the State's position at trial. Defendant 
repeatedly asserts that the State's theory of the case was based 
on its contention that the sole function and use of the chemicals 
found on defendant's premises was to produce a controlled 
substance. This is incorrect. The State's position was that the 
combination and amount of chemicals found on defendant's premises, 
along with the type of lab equipment in use, were consistent with 
the production of a controlled substance. The State's witness, 
D.E.A. Chemist Chuck Hall, admitted that there are any number of 
uses for many of the chemicals found on defendant's premises. The 
State does not discount that defendant could have produced 
fertilizers and sprays at his house, nor that many of the 
chemicals could be used in any number of chemical processes. 
There is no dispute that of eighty to one hundred chemicals 
seized, only about thirteen samples of the substances were 
preserved for analysis (P.T. 14-15). However, before destruction 
of the chemicals which were deemed hazardous and non-storable, an 
inventory was taken (P.T. 16). Through this inventory, and his 
own testimony, defendant could essentially establish what 
chemicals he possessed, and attempt to establish his defense. It 
was not necessary that he have samples of the destroyed chemicals 
available for independent analysis to establish his defense that 
his possession of the chemicals was legitimate. 
The evidence was conclusive that the chemicals, in the 
amount found, were being used to produce phenyl-2-propanone. 
phenyl-2-propanone was found in defendant's garage laboratory (T. 
232-235). Mr. Hall testified that there is no legitimate legal 
use for phenyl-2-propanone, except perhaps in the production of 
cat food (T. 223). Defendant never claimed to be making cat food, 
nor did he testify to what legitimate use he was putting phenyl-2-
propanone. Mr. Hall also testified that phenyl-2-propanone is not 
a by-product of any other chemical processes (T. 115). The police 
found 750 pounds of phenylacetic acid in defendant's garage 
laboratory (T. 219). Phenylacetic acid is a precursor to the 
production of phenyl-2-propanone (T. 113). Mr. Hall testified 
that the only other known use for phenylacetic acid is in the 
production of perfume (T. 172). He testified that he was aware of 
no other chemical synthesis for this acid (T. 172). Defendant did 
not argue at trial, nor does he argue now, that he was producing 
perfume. In fact, defendant does not specifically name any 
innocent uses for the phenylacetic acid. In his testimony, 
defendant claims that he produced fertilizers and plant sprays at 
his home (T. 495). He never testified at trial how he used the 
phenylacetic acid, nor does he propose any alternate uses on 
appeal. 
Defendant's vague assertions of materiality do not rise 
to a constitutional level. If defendant were to propose an 
alternate explanation for the presence of th€* chemicals, which he 
does not, the presence of the destroyed chemicals would merely 
"have corroborated the defendant's story, it would not have been 
exculpatory." State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant has failed to show that the evidence destroyed was vital 
to the issue of whether defendant was guilty of the charge. He, 
therefore, is not entitled to reversal of the conviction. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS NOT INVALID AS A 
RESULT OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE'S 
INCORPORATION OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
ENUMERATED IN THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES ACT. 
Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986) 
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and S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) , which incorporate substances 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3 (1986) states: 
(1) All controlled substances listed in 
S 58-37-4 are hereby controlled. 
(2) All controlled substances listed in 
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title 
II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time 
to time, are hereby controlled. 
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, 
rescheduled, or deleted as a controlled 
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV, of V 
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules 
may be revised by Congresional enactment or 
by administrative rule of the United States 
contained in schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act into the Utah statutory scheme, results in an 
unconstitutional delegation of authority by the Utah legislature. 
He also claims that the inclusion of the federally-defined 
controlled substances does not give adequate notice of what 
conduct is prohibited by Utah statute. 
"It is a well-established rule that legislative 
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and 
will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no 
reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming 
to constitutional requirements." In re Criminal Investigation, 
7th Dist. Court No. CS-lf 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988), citing 
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974). See also 
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987); Murray City v. Hall, 
Cont. Attorney General adopted pursuant to 
S 201 of that act, that subsequent 
designation, rescheduling or deletion shall 
govern. 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) states: 
(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor included in 
scheduels I, II, III, IV or V of Section 58-
37-4, and also includes a drug, substance, or 
immediate precursor included in schedules I, 
II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, as 
those schedules may be revised to add, 
delete, or transfer substances from one 
schedule to another, whether by Congressional 
enactment or by administrative rule of the 
United States Attorney General adopted under 
Section 201 of that act. Controlled 
substance does not include distilled spirits, 
wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are 
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding 
tobacco or food. 
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). The appellate court must look to the 
••reasonable or actual legislative purpose" in evaluating 
constitutional challenges. Id. The burden is on the challenging 
party to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute. Rio 
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984). All 
doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality. Ellis v. 
Social Service Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, defendant relies on State v. 
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), as the basis for his argument 
that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986) and S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 
1988) unconstitutionally delegate the authority of the Utah 
legislature. However, as more fully set-forth below, Gallion was 
decided under a statute that has since been revised, and the 
delegation of authority under the present statutory scheme 
applied in this case is not barred by article V, section I of the 
Utah Constitution. Because Gallion does not control the outcome 
of this case, and defendant has not demonstrated that Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37-3 and 58-37-2(4) are unconstitutional, this Court 
should find there is a reasonable basis for construing the 
statutes to conform to constitutional requirements. 
The Utah legislature has enacted a detailed statutory 
scheme in an effort to manage the dissemination of controlled 
substances and criminalize conduct in violation of the law. Utah 
Code Ann. S 58-37-4 (1986) contains schedules I through V in 
which controlled substances are specifically enumerated. Section 
58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B) specifically name amphetamine, its 
salts optical isomers, and salts of its optical isomers, and 
methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers, as 
being controlled. Phenyl-2-propanone is an immediate precursor 
to amphetamine and methamphetamine (T. 113, 118). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-3 (1986) and S 58-37-2(4) unequivocably state that in 
addition to the controlled substances specifically enumerated in 
S 58-37-4, additional substances enumerated in the schedules of 
the Federal Controlled Substances Act are also controlled in 
Utah. In other words, the legislature has legislated by 
reference to the federal schedules to name additional controlled 
substances. 
Given the nature of the problems related to the 
management of controlled substances, it would be impracticable to 
impose an absolute bar on the legislature's authority to delegate 
certain fact finding processes in which a determination is made 
that substance should be controlled. The United States Congress 
has delegated to the United States Attorney General, the head of 
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the authority to classify substances 
as controlled. The DEA has the expertise to evaluate new 
substances and determine whether they should be controlled. The 
delegation of this authority has survived constitutional 
challenge. See United States v. Emerson, 846 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Gallion was decided twelve years ago, and did not 
recognize or address the explosion of development in the drug 
industry. A number of state courts which have addressed the 
issue and upheld the delegation of authority by the legislature 
in similar circumstances have recognized the need for such 
delegation. In State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514, 517 
(1977), the court stated: 
The state of the drug art is constantly 
undergoing change, revision and development. 
Thousands of potentially dangerous drugs 
exist, and it would be impossible for the 
legislature to consider each drug and 
evaluate the need for prescription status. 
Delegation of the drug-by-drug evaluation is 
a necessary and proper exercise of 
legislative authority. 
In Montoya v. 0'Tooele, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190, 192 (1980), 
the court recognized the "enormous burden" that would be placed 
on the legislature if it were required to consider each of the 
thousands of new drugs manufactured by pharmaceutical companies 
each year. The legislature would still need to rely upon experts 
in the area for assistance in making determinations of which 
substances should be controlled. The determinations must be 
reviewed continuously, and the lack of attention by the 
legislature due to time constraints and the limited opportunity 
to act could result in dangerous drugs being disseminated prior 
to legislative enactments. Id. 
The Utah legislature convenes only once a year, 
excluding special sessions. It has a huge number of bills to 
consider and only a limited amount of time. For months on end, 
when the legislature is out of session, new drugs are continually 
being developed, which would not be subject to control at all 
until the next session. Given the high technology and rapid 
development in both the legitimate and illicit drug industries, 
it is particularly important that alternatives for fact finding 
be allowed. As in the case of phenyl-2-propanone, other new 
drugs are continually being developed and must be subject to 
timely control. The legislature must be allowed to delegate, at 
least in part, the fact finding process. 
In State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the legislature had provided an 
unconstitutional delegation of power when it allowed the Utah 
Attorney General to decide that Demerol should be regulated as a 
controlled substance. The legislature had not specifically 
included Demerol on the schedules of controlled substances. Utah 
Code Ann. S 58-37-2(2) (1974) provided: MThe attorney general 
of the state of Utah shall administer the provisions of this act 
and may add or delete substances or reschedule all substances 
enumerated in the schedule in section 58-37-4." (Emphasis 
added.) The Court found this section to be in contravention of 
article V, section I of the Utah Constitution, which provides: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
(Emphasis added.) The Court noted that the Utah attorney general 
is a member of the executive department and had an obvious 
potential conflict. The attorney general should be aware of 
The statutory scheme has been substantially revised and no 
longer contains this provision. 
possible constitutional problems in statutes and could be placed 
in the "anomalous position of exercising a potential challenge to 
a law he has, in fact, amended," K** a t 686. Following Gallionf 
Utah'8 controlled substances statutory scheme was revised. The 
Utah attorney general no long has statutory authority to 
designate what substances are to be controlled. As a result, 
under the revised statutes (now S 58-37-3 (1986) and S 58-37-
2(4)), article V, section I of the Utah Constitution is not 
offended, as "no person" within the Utah executive department has 
been charged with a function of the legislative department. 
Defendant also contends that Gallion precludes the 
legislature from delegating its power to define crimes and enact 
penalties. The inclusion by reference of the federal controlled 
substances schedules, which are substantially similar in design 
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to the Utah counterparts, do not constitute an improper 
delegation of power to enact criminal statutes. The Utah 
legislature has determined that it is illegal to possess, 
manufacture, distribute, etc., controlled substances, absent 
express authority. The contested provisions simply allow 
adoption by reference to specifically enumerated substances that 
are determined controlled by the federal government. 
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act has been adopted, with 
minor variations by at least forty-five states. The act closely 
follows the federal controlled substance laws. The purpose of 
the act is to establish a rational approach to regulating 
potentially dangerous substances, which are uniform with other 
states and the federal counterparts. The act established five 
schedules, which delineate drugs according to their medical value 
and potential for abuse. State v. Peloquin, 427 A.2d 1327, 1328, 
1328 n. 3 (R.I. 1981). 
Defendant also contends that the incorporation of the 
federal controlled substances schedules does not provide him with 
adequate notice of what acts constitute criminal conduct in Utah. 
Defendant's argument is without merit. Utah statutes, 
specifically Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986) and 58-37-2(4) 
(Supp. 1988), specifically and unequivocably state that the term 
-controlled substance11 includes all drugs and their immediate 
precursors listed in schedules I through V of Utah Code Ann. S 
58-37-4 and all substances and their immediate precursors listed 
in schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act. The Federal Act specifically designates the United States 
Attorney General, as head of the Drug Enforcement Agency, to name 
controlled substances and sets forth detailed, specific 
procedures that must be followed. 21 U.S.C. S 811 (1988). The 
result in published in schedules I through V of the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. S 812) and in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
Although it may be slightly more complex to determine 
what substances are controlled in Utah by also examining federal 
law, it is nevertheless clear and specifically defined. Further, 
a person who is concerned about the legality of possession of a 
substance at all, would necessarily be concerned about what would 
constitute a violation of, not only Utah law, but federal law as 
well. Therefore, one must, in any event, examine the federal 
schedules in order to be informed. 
Even absent the specific proclamation under the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act that phenyl-2-propanone is controlled, 
defendant should have been on notice that possession or 
manufacture of the drug was illegal based solely upon the 
provisions of the Utah Code. Phenyl-2-propanone is an immediate 
precursor to amphetamine and methamphetamine, both of which are 
specifically enumerated as controlled substances in Utah. Utah 
Code Ann. S 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B). The possession of an 
immediate precursor of a specifically enumerated controlled 
substance is unlawful. Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988). 
The Utah legislature did not unconstitutionally 
delegate its authority by enacting Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 
(1986) and S 58-37-2(4), which include in the Utah statutory 
definition of a controlled substance additional substances that 
are enumerated in the Federal Controlled Substances Act. These 
statutes do not violate the non-delegation doctrine contained in 
article I, section V of the Utah Constitution, and defendant was 
given adequate notice that his conduct was unlawful in Utah. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 WAS NOT ERROR. 
Defendant claims that he was denied the opportunity to 
challenge the administrative procedure and findings of the United 
States Attorney General with regard to the inclusion of phenyl-2-
propanone as a controlled substance under the federal act. 
Defendant implies that the trial court should have given his 
proposed instruction No. 1 so that he could have made this 
challenge. Defendant does not claim that the trial court's 
refusal to give his proposed instruction constitutes reversible 
error or entitles him to a new trial. (Defendant's opening brief 
at 43-44.) 
Defendant certainly had the opportunity to challenge 
the procedures utilized in determining that phenyl-2-propanone is 
a controlled substance. In fact, he did move to dismiss the 
charges against him because phenyl-2-propanone is not enumerated 
on the controlled substances schedules in the Utah Code (T. 30-
45). He could have also taken the opportunity to challenge the 
procedures used by the United States Attorney General to 
determine that phenyl-2-propanone is controlled, if there were 
merit to this claim, but chose not to. Instead, he submitted 
proposed Instruction No. 1 (Appendix A). Defendant did not raise 
the issue during the course of the trial, and the record does not 
support a finding that there was anything incorrect about the 
procedures used by the United States Attorney General in 
determining that phenyl-2-propanone is a controlled substance. 
Under these circumstances, this Court should assume the 
correctness of the trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's 
conviction. State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 
(Utah 1985). 
Defendant cites only to State v. Gallion# 572 P.2d 683 
(Utah 1977), and does not demonstrate where the trial court's 
error lies. The purpose of jury instructions is to set forth 
issues and the applicable law in clear and concise terms, so the 
that jury will understand how it should discharge its duties. 
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980). If defendant wanted 
to raise as a defense a claim that the procedures were not 
followed, it was incumbent on him to present some evidence in 
this regard. Absent a reasonable basis in the record as to a 
defense, the trial court is not required to instruct on the 
issue. See State v. Hardingy 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981). 
The State has the burden of proving all elements of the 
offense, and it did so. The trial court instructed the jury on 
the applicable burden of proof (Instruction No. 8, appendix B) 
and presumption of innocence (Instruction No. 6, appendix C). 
Defendant does not contend that if his instruction had been 
given, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Absent this showing, the conviction must be affirmed. State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, Michael Lewis Green, aka James Alvin 
Douglas, was properly convicted of manufacturing a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute. For the foregoing reasons, as well as any additional 
arguments made at the time of oral argument, the State of Utah 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of October, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAMN 
Utah Attorney General 
ARNSCW fBARA BEJ 
f s i s tant Attorney General 
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APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX A 
/ .< * ' ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed t h a t under the laws of the State of Utah 
Phenyl-2-Pnopanone, or P-2-P, is not a controlled subs tance . How-
ever , if a substance has been lawfully made a controlled substance 
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, then i t is controlled 
under the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
Therefore, if the Scate proves beyond a reasonable doubt: 
A: 1. Thac the Jnited States Attorney General by rule 
scheduled the substance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propa-
none as a controlled substance; 
2. That the United States Attorney General made a 
f inding, after a hear ing in accordance with his 
rulemaking procedures, which a t l eas t allowed for 
a hear ing on the record, t h a t P-2-P has a potential 
for abuse; 
3. That the United States Attorney General found t h a t 
t h e substance P-2-P: 
a. Has a potential for abuse less than the drugs 
on schedules I and I I ; 
b . Has a cur ren t ly accepted medical use in t r ea t -
ment in the United States; and 
c . Abuse of the substance may lead to moderate 
or low physical dependence or high psychological 
dependence; and 
4. That notice of sa id action was properly published in 
in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Reg-
ulat ions. ; or 
B: That the United States Attorney General properly found, 
pu r suan t to a hear ing and i n accordance with his ru l e -
making author i ty , t h a t P-2-P was an immediate precurser 
in t h a t : 
a . the Attorney General has found i t to be and by 
regula t ion designated as being the principal compound 
used, or produced pr imari ly for use, in the manu-
facture of a controlled substance; 
b . I t is an immediate chemical intermediary used or 
l ikely to be used in the manufacture of a control led 
substance; and 
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c. The control of which is is necessary to prevent 
curtail , or limit the manufacture of such controlled 
substance. 
then you may determine that the substance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propa-
none is a controlled substance under Utah Law. 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
The burden rests upon the prosecution to establish every 
element of the crime with which the Defendant is charged, and 
every element of the crime must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If any one or more elements of the crime is 
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt then the defendant is 
entitled to be found not guilty. 
The Defendant has no burden to either produce evidence 
or establish any fact. No burden is ever to be shifted to the 
Defendant. 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTION NO. p 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent 
until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded 
by the jury at pleasure, but is a sustantial, essential part of 
the law and is binding upon the jury. This presumption is a 
humane provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency 
is capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person 
being unjustly punished. This presumption attends the 
defendant through every stage in the trial, and, if possible, 
you should reconcile the evidence with this presumption, and in 
case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, you should acquit the defendant. 
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